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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
RAY DODGE,
PetitionerAppellant,

v.

Case No.

JOHN W. TURNER,
Warden, Ftah State Prison,

10880

RespondentRespondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Ray Dodge, appeals from the denial of a writ of habeas corpus by the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Hearing was held on appellant's petition for
writ of habeas corpus on the 23rd day of March,
1967, before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, District Judge of the Second Judicial District, Weber
County, following which the writ was denied and
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the appellant remanded back to the Utah State
Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the judgment of the
Second District Court denying the petition for writ
of habeas corpus be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant, a prisoner in the Utah State
Prison, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the District Court of Weber County. As far as respondent can determine, the petition alleges, among
other things, that appellant is unlawfully restrained
of his liberty at the Utah State Prison because: (1) he
was not represented by counsel at the time of his
initial arraignment in Ogden City Court on the
charge of burglary in the second degree and of being an habitual criminal; (2) he was not represented
by counsel at the time he waived preliminary examination; (3) he did not effectively waive his right to
counsel or to a preliminary examination; (4) incompetence of counsel at trial; (5) he was improperly
sentenced for being an habitual criminal; (6) he was
improperly sentenced for the crime of first degree
perjury.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition, and on March 15, 1967, Judge Wahlquist ruled
the allegations enumerated as 4, 5, and 6, above,
had previously been raised by appellant on appeal
to the Utah Supreme Court, and that a hearinq
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would be held on matter relating to allegations
enumerated above as l, 2, and 3. (R-12) Counsel stipulated that the transcript of proceedings in the
burglary and habitual criminal actions could be introduced into evidence.11
On May 12, 1965, appellant was charged in the
City Court of Ogden City, County of Weber, with
the crime of burglary in the second degree and on
a separate complaint with being an habitual criminal. He appeared that date before the Honorable
Donald 0. Hyde, City Judge, whereupon the complaints were read to appellant and copies delivered
to him.
The transcript reflects:
The Court informed defendant of his legal right to
a preliminary examination and to the aid of counsel
at every stage of the proceedings against him, and
he is asked bv the Court if he desires the aid of counsel to which he answers that he does.

The matter was continued to May 21, 1965, for further proceedings. (T-1)
On May 21, the appellant appeared again before Judge Hyde. At that time he requested permission to waive preliminary examination. The State
consented to the waiver and the appellant was
bound over to the Second District Court to answer.
(T-1)

1I The transcript of proceedings in the burglary and habitual criminal
actions will be referred to as "T". The proceedings in the hearing on
appellant's petition for habeas corpus will be referred to as "R''.
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An Information was filed May 27, 1965, by the
District Attorney charging appellant with burglary
in the second degree and, on page 2 of the Information, with being an habitual criminal. Appellant was
arraigned on the Information June 1, 1965, before
the Honorable Charles G. Cowley, at which time
counsel was appointed to represent him. (T-5) On
June 7, 1965, the appellant entered his plea of not
guilty to the charges on page 1 and 2 of the Information. (T-6)
Jury trial was had June 29, 1965, and appellant
was found guilty of burglary in the second degree
and was found to be an habitual criminal. (T-11) On
July 1, 1965, Judge Cowley sentenced Dodge for
burglary in the second degree and for being an
habitual criminal to a term in the Utah State Prison
of "not less than fifteen years and which may be
for life." (T-21)
At the hearing on appellant's petition for a wnt
of habeas corpus, Dodge testified that between May
12, and May 21, 1965, he contacted an attorney to
represent him. Apparently appellant did not make
the necessary financial arrangements with the attorney. (R-7) He contacted no other attorney. (R-8)
Appellant testified that when he appeared on
May 21, 1965, before Judge Hyde, the following occurred:
A. He asked me if I was ready to proceed and I told
him that I never had a lawyer so I wanted to waive
my preliminary hearing, and he said, "Do you realize
what you are doing-?' I think that is what he said and
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I said, 'Yes, I want to waive my preliminary hearing.'

Richard L. Stine, Esq., testified at the hearing as
a witness for respondent. He stated he was appointed by the Court to represent appellant at the trial
(R-30), that the sentences that could be imposed on
appellant were discussed {R-31), that Dodge did not
request Stine to obtain a preliminary examination
for him (R-31), that in his (Stine's) opinion, a preliminary examination would not have been of assistance in Dodge's defense {R-32), nor would have a
Bill of Particulars been of any benefit {R-32).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS BY CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS NO
IRREGULARITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS.

At the time of his appearance in Ogden City
Court before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, City
Judge, the transcript indicates that appellant was
properly advised of his right to legal counsel and
to a preliminary examination, at which time the appellant indicated he desired legal counsel, whereupon the court continued the matter to May 21, 1965.
On May 21, before the same court, appellant
requested permission to waive the preliminary examination, which was consented to by the Assistant
County Attorney, whereupon the City Judge bound
over the appellant to District Court. (T-1, 2)
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On June 7, 1965, the appellant and his counsel
appeared before Judge Cowley to enter a plea of not
guilty to the Information. (T-6) Jury trial was held
June 29, 1965, within a month following appellant's
voluntary waiver of preliminary examination in Ogden City Court. Had appellant desired a preliminary
examination, he could have moved the District
Court to remand the case back to the City Court for
a preliminary examination. Respondent submits that
appellant's waiver of preliminary examination, plus
his failure to move the District Court for a remand
to City Court to conduct a preliminary examination,
constitutes a knowledgable and voluntary waiver
by appellant of his right to a preliminary examination.
Although appellant was not represented by
counsel at the time he waived preliminary examination before the Ogden City Court, his failure to request a preliminary examination following the appointment of counsel to represent him tends to
negate his claim that he was denied due process of
law. In fact, he stated he did not remember ever requesting Mr. Stine secure a preliminary examination
for him. (R-21, 22)
In McGuffey v. Turner. ________ Utah ________ 2d _______ ,
423 P.2d 166, 167 (1967), this court, in reversing a
District Court ruling granting a writ of habeas
corpus, stated:
It is the practice in the trial courts of this state to
remand a criminal case for preliminary hearing when
the defendant requests it at arraignment when ti:e
preliminary hearing has been theretofor waived. It 1'

,

1

1
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rather difficult to see how a guilty defendant is prejudiced by waiving a preliminary hearing when all that
is entailed at the hearing is that sufficient evidence
be given to the committing magistrate to cause him
to believe that a crime has been committed and that
there is probably cause to believe the defendant
guilty thereof.

See also Utah Code Ann.

§

77-15-19 (1953).

This Court held in State v. Freeman, 93 Utah 125,
71 P.2d 196 (1937), that before a defendant can be
bound over to District Court he is entitled to a preliminary examination unless, with consent of th~
State, he waives such hearing; and if hearing is
waived, defendant thereby, impliedly at least,
agrees that the evidence the State would have produced would have been sufficient to justify the
magistrate holding him over; and thereby consents
that he be held for trial, and that no witnesses need
be produced.
In State v. Seymour, 18 Utah 2d 153, 417 P.2d
655 (1966), this court was confronted with an almost
identical situation. The court decided the following
issue:
Assuming that the defendant was without counsel
when he waived preliminary hearing, is that a defect
of such gravity as to invalidate his conviction?

Concluding that it was not such a defect, the court
stated at page 658:
There had been some previous discussion with the
court in regard to the defendant having an attorney.
Whether he was advised to waive the preliminary
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hearing or not, it is indisputable that he had conferred with his attorney, Mr. Hisatake, about something; and that he appeared in court and voluntarily
stated his desire to waive a preliminary hearing.
After he was bound over, the District Court appointed
competent counsel who proceeded to represent him
and who conducted the trial in his behalf. If the defendant or his counsel had in good faith believed that
a preliminary hearing would have helped him in any
way, there was ample opportunity to request one. We
suspect that it was deliberate that no such request
was made. Rather he attempted to take advantage
of the claimed defect in proceedure by moving to have
the charge against him dismissed entirely. This is
something he was not entitled to. Such a defect as
he complains of would not in any event have the
effect of totally exonerating him of the offense
charged, but would only be subject to correction if
he so requested and the interest of justice so required.

Appellant raised the issue of his lack of counsel
prior to waiving preliminary examination in his previous appeal as "allegation 5". This court chose not
to give cognizance to this issue in that case. See
State v. Dodge. 18 Utah 2d 63, 415 P.2d 212 (1966).
It is apparent that appellant was advised of h~:;
right to counsel and that he contacted an attorney
to represent him. At the hearing on his petition for
writ of habeas corpus, appellant stated:
I tried to make a deal with Mr. Richards to represent
me, but I couldn't get any money, so when I went
to court I waived preliminary hearing and went on
to the District Court. ( R-5)

Respondent submits further that the appellant
was aware of his rights to a hearing and counsel
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and with the proceedings at preliminary examination by reason of his previous scrapes with the law,
having been involved with felony charges on three
previous occasions. (R-14) As such, his waiver of
preliminary examination without counsel present
was voluntary. See Workman v. Tumer. ........ Utah
2d ________ , 425 P.2d 402 (1967).
This court has previously held that a voluntary
waiver of preliminary examination precludes a defendant thereafter from asserting, in any subsequent proceedings, anything he could have asserted had the examination taken place, and he cannot
claim a discharge because no examination was held,
nor later complain of irregularities because they
were waived when the defendant fails to raise them
at the proper time. See State v. Freeman. 93 Utah
125, 71 P.2d 196 (1937), and State v. Gustaldi. 41 Utah
63, 123 Pac. 897 (1912). Nor are the proceedings vitiated even though the accused has not waived his
right to counsel. State v. Crank. 105 Utah 332, 142
P.2d 178, 170 A.LR. 542 (1943).
Nor does the failure of the accused to have
counsel at preliminary examination constitute prejudicial error. Since the preliminary examination is
an inquiry, not a trial, it is held in the place of the
common law grand jury where the accused is only
present if called as a witness. State v. Braasch. et. al..
119 Utah 450, 229 P.2d 289 (1951).
Numerous courts have determined that, under
laws similar to the Utah statutes, the failure to haVF~
counsel at preliminary examination is not prejudi-
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cial to the accused. The United States Supreme
Court has determined that in certain jurisdictions,
wherein preliminary examination or initial arraignment are critical stages in a criminal proceeding,
counsel must be afforded the accused. See Hamilton v. Alabama. 368 U.S. 52 (1961), and White v.
Maryland. 373 U.S. 59 (1963). However, the White
and Hamilton cases have no application here because they deal with facts totally different from the
instant case and proceedure unique to those jurisdictions.
Waiver of preliminary examination or absence
of counsel at that stage is not prejudicial to an accused. In point is the case of Freeman v. State. 392
P.2d 542 (Idaho 1964), wherein the court stated:
While it is recognized that an accused has a right to
counsel at every stage in the proceedings, we do not
understand this to mean that he must be so represented in the preliminary processes which take place
primarily for the purpose of ascertaining whether a
crime has been committed and whether there are
reasonable grounds to hold that the accused has committed it, and particularly, where no prejudice has
befallen him.

See also State v. Cox. 183 Kansas 571, 396 P.2d 326
(1964), citing Latham v. Crouse, 320 Federal 2d 120
(10 Cir. 1963), wherein the court stated:
The first contention is that petitioner's were en·
titled to have counsel appointed for them prior to the
preliminary examination. Heavy reliance is placed
on the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Gideon v. Wainright Corrections Director, 372
U.S. 385 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed 2d 799. That case con-
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cerned the right of an accused to counsel at trialnot at a preliminary hearing. In State of Utah v.
Sullivan, 10 Cir., 227 F.2d 511, 513, certiorari denied sub nom., and Braasch v. State, 350 U.S. 973,
76 S.Ct. 499, 100 L.Ed. 844, we held that in circumstances where an accused did not enter a plea of
guilty at a preliminary hearing, the failure to furnish
counsel at such hearing did not abridge the accused's
fundamental constitutional right. That decision is
controlling here. No claim is made of any incriminating statements or acts of the petitioners at the preliminary examination. All they did was to waive the
right to a preliminary hearing. Prejudice is asserted
on the ground that counsel would have forced the
prosecution to disclose at least some of its evidence.
The point is not well taken as more than a month
in advance of trial copies of the confessions and lists
of the prosecution's witnesses were given defense
counsel. Our conclusions in State of Utah v. Sullivan
are supported by the decisions of other circuits. We
find nothing in Gideon v. Wainright which requires
a review of the decision in State of Utah v. Sullivan.

Respondent submits that appellant was in no
way prejudiced by not having counsel at the time
he waived preliminary examination. Had he wanted
counsel, he could have requested it. Had he desired
a preliminary examination, he could have obtained
one. His failure to request counsel be appointed for
him prior to waiving his preliminary examination,
having full knowledge of the purpose of a preliminary examination and the rights afforded to him by
reason of his past experiences, indicates a voluntary
waiver and one of which the appellant cannot now
claim a defect of such gravity as would entitle him
to be discharged from the Utah State Prison and the
judgment of conviction reversed.
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Utah Code Ann.

§

77-16-2 (1953), provides:

No defect or irregularity in or want or absence of
any proceeding or statutory requirement, prior to
the filing of an information or indictment, including
the preliminary hearing, shall constitute prejudicial
error and the defendant shall be conclusively presumed to have waived any such defect, irregularity,
want or absence of proceeding of statutory requirement, unless he shall before pleading to the information or indictment specifically and expressly object
to the information or indictment on such groun<l .
. . . (Emphasis added).

Appellant had the opportunity to obtain a preliminary examination had he so wanted one by requesting the District Court to remand the case to
the City Court. This he and his counsel admit was
not done. As such, they have effectively waived the
right to preliminary examination.
Appellant had the opportunity to request a bill
of particulars. At least one week elapsed from his
arraignment in District Court at which time counsel
was appointed for him and the time scheduled for
entry of his plea. Prior to the entry of his plea, respondent could have moved to quash the Information and could have demanded a Bill of Particulars.
His counsel was of the opinion that it would be of
no benefit to appellant's defense. (R-32) Having
failed to so demand a Bill of Particulars, appellant
waived the right. Appellant is estopped to urge on
appeal error in the trial court for the failure of the
court to provide a bill of particulars. See State v.
Bleazard. 103 Utah 113 133 P.2d 1000 (1943).
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With respect to appellant's claim that he was improperly sentenced as an habitual criminal, this
matter has previously been resolved by this court.
Respondent submits that appellant incorrectly cites
the record on this point in support of his allegation.
(T-20)
It is well settled that the petitioner in a habeas
corpus proceeding has the burden of proving the
grounds upon which he relies for his release by
evidence that is clear and convincing. See McGuffey v. Turner. op.cit., citing Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.LR.
357 (1938); Wilson v. Hand. 181 Kan. 483, 311 P.2d
009 (1957); and Application of Gaskill. (Okl. Cr.) 335
P.2d 1088 (1959). See also Workman v. Turner.
________ Utah 2d ________ , 425 P.2d 402 (1967).
Respondent submits that appellant has failed to
prove any grounds upon which relief can be granted, and further, the evidence adduced by him at
the hearing was less than clear and convincing.
An examination of the record discloses that the
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 (1953),
were complied with by Judge Hyde. (T-16) A reasonable time was allowed appellant to obtain counsel
and, respondent submits, a postponement of the preliminary examination would have been granted appellant had he so requested for the purpose of obtaining counsel or having the court appoint counsel
for him.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant's contentions on appeal are totally
without merit. No cases exist for reversal or for discharge of appellant from incarceration. Therefore,
respondent submits that the judgment of the District
Court denying appellant's petition for writ of habeas
corpus be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
WARREN M. WEGGELAND
Special Assistant Attorney
General
Attorneys for Respondent
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

